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Some Memorable Aspects of the Tax
Reform by the Shoup Mission
-An Interview with Dr. C.S. Shoup at Sandwich-
Shiro Takahashi
1. Introduction
The most impressive day in my l i f e  began with a l i g h t  morning
rain. 0 n  August31,1983, I visited the home of Dr. Shoup in
Sandwich,a smal lbeaut i fu l town i n  N H,USA,
Dr. CarlSumner Shoup is a quite famous scholar,and what is
more,he is significant for us as the head of the Shoup Tax Mission
to Japan that made recommendations i n  the Rej)o r t o'l J a j)anese
Taxation in1949.1 ) Fortunately,I was  able to hear directly his
verbalevidence about some significant aspects of the report in a
1engthy interview with  h im  i n  Sandwich last  year.
The1949report became the base of the present tax system in
Japan which showed theoreticalconsistency especia1ly in relation
to indiv idualand corporate income taxes. I t  attempted to realize
tax equity for each ind iv idualby combining the system induced
from a theory which regards a corporaition a s “ a  particular kind
of aggregation of individuals” with an  a l l inc lus ive  individual
1 )  Shoup Mission, Report o,: Japanese Tantion. GeneralHeadquarters
Supreme Commander for the A11ied Powers, 1949 We ca l l i t  ''the1949
report”throughout this paper.- 2 l 1- 1
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income tax system at progressive rates.2 ) Almost allrecommenda-
tions of the1949report were e:nacted in1950with a few except-
ions. However, many significantparts of thelegislation have been
gradually modified as time haspassed. Today, the Japanese tax
system is far removed from the originallegislation. As a result,
it is now so complicated and unequitable that i t  can nolonger be
ignored.
As the situation has became criticalmore and more, voices are
being raised f o r a  revision of the system. For enmple, a hasty
proposalhas been made to introduce a l a rge  scale indirect tax.
Such a proposalis often too easily supported from the viewpoint
of redressing deficit final:icing or to correct an imbalance between
direct and indirect taxes. I:n fact, there has been an unfavorable
generaltendency i n  a series of Japanesepost war tax revisions to
reform the system at random from a short sighted point of view,
talang no account of obvious theoreticalinconsistencies. Any tax
reform based on sueh an inconsistentposition can never offer more
than apartialsolution to tax revision. I n  this respect, the1949
report as a standard of the present tax system contains many mean-
ingfulsuggestions for any future tax program. The chief aim of
thispaper is to suggest some basic materials for reevaluating the
1949report.
Thus, thispaper is writtenin dialogue and necessaryprocedures
mentioned below were followed to reproduce my interview with
Dr. Shoup as authentic as possible. At first, I sent to Dr. Shoup
my transcription of the tapeof the interview to ask for his per-
mission to publish it. Then, I d:rew a finalmanuscript from his
2) 」lOid'.. volume I. p.105.
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affirmative reply with some necessarycorrections and returned i t
to him again to get his confirmation of the content and his final
permission to publish it.
I want to express my thanks to a l l w h o  supported me in the
course of preparing thispaper. Particularly, to Dr. Shoup,without
whom, thispaper could not have been written. Words cannot ex-
press my indebtedness to him.
2. The Basic Object of t h e l949Report
Takahashi:What is a basic object of preparing the1949 :report?
Dr. Shoup:The basic object was to introduce a ta:x system that
would be workable,fair and accord with modern ideas of a good
tax system. 0 f  course,wecame into apayments problem. And this
must be remembered:the tax system was almost in chaos i n l 9 ,49.
They were collecting taxes by methods that reminded you of the
old tax farming methods of the French of the18th century where
they would se1lthe rights to certain areas to some tax farmer who
would collect money in any way he could. The only difference
here was that instead of the tax farmersthey had military colonels
and so on who were made responsible for bringing i n  a certain
amount of money. They in tum used techniques very crude and
sometimes rather forceful. And everyone was unhappy. So that,I
think that the people often don't recognize how chaotic the situa-
tion was,when we came in. What we sought was to get some-
thing that was simple and workable and operated by generalrules
and to rephce this unjust system of ad hoc kind of taxation without
anyliterally ascertainable rules. As a taxpayer then, you  didn't
know what you were going topay. Yoti were told finally by tax-213- 3
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authority,“This is it.”But, everything was mixed up badly. So,
we sought to bring order. And i n  doing that, w e  thought that we
might suggest a tax system that went i n  the right direction,one
that could develop into, if youlike,an idealtax system. And that
is really what we tried to do. As we said here i n  the foreword,
a chief aim of our mission had been to draw up a pIan of a p e r-
manent tax system for .fapan.3 ) And emphasis had been placed on
considerations that go beyond the f inancing problems of the pre-
sent year. But, we specified how to handle the present year and
the next year. And,as we said, this long term program could
have been either one or the other. I t  could been a sort of a prim-
itive type of tax system that would depend on externalsigns of
income and so on. Something extremely simple that anybody could
understand. 0 r, on the other hand, we could set up a system that
was more complex,but that could be understood if you studied
and tookcare. As welooked around and talked to our counterparts,
we finally had no trouble reaching a decision that the more com-
plex tax system could easily be handled, because, the Japanese
had a highlevelof literacy and a very highlevelof  intelligence
generally. So,we said no to the primitive system and suggested
a basically sound system that was somewhat complex but not too
much so. We said our aim. I t  was “to recommend a modern system,
which depends on the w 加ingness of business meD and alltaxpay-
ers of substantialmeans to keep books and to reason carefully
about some fairly complicated issues of equity. For the smal ltax-
payer, at the same time, the task of filing returns and paying the
tax should be kept a simple one. Under this approach,we see no
3
）4
c. f.1biia., volume I, ]l;1oreword p. 1
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reason why Japan may not within a few years,if she so desires,
have what would be the best tax system in the world.”◆) While I
am on the subject, l e t's remember that in fact this tax system
was put entirely into force and waslegislated with only one or
two minor .exceptions within a few months after we submitted the
report. For a few months, for a year or so, Japan had this system.
Then,the Korean War came along. There was apoliticalchange.
Politically conservative elements gained controlof the government.
That was the democratic process at work. But, this report was
not written for a highly conservativegroup. As soon as the con-
servative group came in,they began to take pieces out the system.
For a year or so,we had that system.
Takahashi:What relationship did thel949report have to the
Dodge Line?
Dr. Shoup:Well,it attempted to raise the amount of money and
the amount of tax revenue that the Dodge Linecalled for. We
took our revenue goalpretty much from the Dodge Line. The
Dodge Line did not specify how the money was to be raised. We
emphasised severaltimes here that inflation must be checked and
we must prevent inflation. I wouldsay that i t  was consistent with
the Dodge Line.
3. The Status of the Tax Mission
Takahashi:What relation did your commission have to GHQ?
Dr. Shoup:We were brought over by GHQ.o) That is to say,
i t  was MacArthur himself who sent Harold Moss over to the U-
4 ) lbid.,volume I Foreword.pp.i-i i.
5 )  GeneralHeadquarters Supreme Commander for the Allie3 Powera.-215- 5
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! lited States to find someone who would form a tax mission. I t
was SCAP.o) I n  ef fect, I  was proposed by generalMacArthur
through Harold Moss. I specified the terms on which I would
accept the assignment and they were agreeable to the General.
So , I  went ahead to recruit the members of the mission. This was
al ldone through the Occupation and not through Japanese author-
ities. But,once we get there,of course,we immediately got i n
touch with the Japanese authorities and worked closely with them
the whole summer.
Takahashi:Did you have a status independent from GHQ?
Dr. Shoup : 0h  yes,we were subject to no restraint at all.
When I went there, theday after I got there, MacArthur asked
me for a talk with him and emphasized that he would place no
limits on our activity. We had a job to do.It was our job and he
would not interfere with i t. H e  never did, allduring the summer.
I saw himperhapstwice. He had us out for a lunch one time at
his house. We could get anything we wanted. We needed trans-
portation throughout Japan. GHQ supplied us with alocomotive
and a private car. But,not once during the whole summer, did
any member of GHQ try to persuade us to do this or that. So,we
were completely free. We wrote the report without any interfer-
ence from anybody in the m出tary. They were really quite good
in  that way. I thought that MacArthur showed great statesman-
ship. He turned this thing over to us completely andsaid,“ I t's
your job. Now do it.” W h e n  we finished the job,he accepted it.
GHQ suggested no changes. They took the report as we had writ-
ten i t. 0 f  course,they were very busy with a number of other
6
）6
Supreme Commander of the Aliied Powers
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things. They did not want to get entangled i n  a very technical
subjectlike taxation. I t  was very happy for us that the job was
left to us. I might add one thing which you might find interesting.
When I talked with MacArthur,the day after w e  arrived, the only
suggestion he made was,“Please don't make a guinea pig out of
Japan.” T h i s  means that we  use gulinea pigs for scientific exper-
iments and we  must not use that occasion to experiment to try a
lot of strange things and so forth. Then ,we  didn't want to do so
anyway. S o , I  agreed to that. That was only the guideline.
4. The Transformation of thel949Report
Takahashi : I  think as  weli as you, that many importantparts
of the1949report remain or survive in the present Japanese tax
system. So , I  don't think that the progress of the1949report from
1949to now resulted i n  a collapse of the tax system which was
legislated according to thel949report. I think that i t  was rather
a revising or changi】1g process, What do you think about this point?
Dr. Shoup:As I have already indicated,I think that the polit-
icalscene changed. If you got more conservative politicalvoices
inpower, the tax system w i l l b e  changed to accord with their
philosophy. But,so far as I know,the main structure of the tax
system stillexists i n  Japan. W e  did not recommend a valtie added
tax for the nationalgovernment. We recommended a very l ight
one for the prefectures that was not accepted. But, no  matter,
that was very smal1;we did not want to have a generalsales tax
on the nationalleve1,because of the burden on the poor. And,
today Japan remains without a generalslaes t a x : t h e  only indus-
trialcountry i n  the world that has none.- 2 l 7- 7
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Talnbashi:How did Korean War affect the1l;49report's prog-
ress?
Dr. Shoup : I  thin]1l: that the Korean War made a l l t he  gover-
nme:nts more cautious and more conservative. So, i t  tended to
bring in mofe conservative elements. But,you know better than
I about that. Do you think that is correct that the Korean War
tended to bring into government more conservative elements i n
1fapan?
Talnhashi:Yes,I think so.
Dr. Shoup:Yes. So,naturally,that had effects on many things
including the tax system.
Takahashi:Was the Japanese govemment moreliberalbefore
Korean War?
Dr. Shoup:As I said, they did put i n  the entire tax system.
I t  was not untilKorean War that the system began to be taken
apart a l i t t le  here and there.
Takahashi:It is sometimes said by some Japanese schohrs that
thel949report was too perfect and i t  aimed to build up a theoret-
icaland permanent tax system. As a result,it. did not suit lfapa-
nese economic conditions i:n those days. What do you think about
this opinion? .
Dr. Shoup: I  don't agree with that. I think that we studied
the ;fapanese economy enough and talked to enough ;fapanese people
to be be realistic. We tried to make the system f i t the economic
conditions. People who say that i t  did not f i t  willhave to explain
specifically whatthay mean,“What did not fit.” W e  made agreat
effort to make everything f it including the blue retum, which we
invented,for the smalltaxpayers. Now,you have a l a:fge associa-
8 -218-
Some Memorable Aspects of the Tax Reform by the Shoup Mission
tions of blue return taxpayers. We made a great effort to make
every part of the system f it the Japanese economy and the Japa -
nese taxpayer. So,if we did not succeed,I'dlike to know exactly
“Where?”A generalcommentl ike that is not very meaningful.
Takahashi : Is  there a fact that Japanese government made
some requests to you suggesting changes i n  the course of preparing
the1949report?
Dr. Shoup :We consulted with them and asked them their ad-
vice at every stage. They did not came forward with many de-
mands or even requests,if that is what you mean. We worked
very closely with the treasury officials,the finance minister, the
head of the tax office and so on. 0 f  course,we told them every-
thing we  were going to suggest,after we worked there for two
or three months,because w e  wanted to know what they thought
about it. No, they didn't make any specialrequests.
5. The Feasibility of the1949Report
Takahash i : I  think that the1949report fundamenta1ly had a
sufficient feasib通ity to be realized under Japanese economic con-
ditions i n  those days. What do you think about my opinion?
Dr. Shoup : I  think that i t  was feasible.
Takahash i : I  think that you might stress its feasibility.
Dr .Shoup :We  emphasized the fact it would be feasible. But,
people would have to work at it. I t  wouldn't be easy but it could
be done. We tried to make i t  very simple for the smalltaxpayer.
Then ,we  insisted that the wealthy taxpayers make some effort
to understand t h e l a w  and comply with it. Japan did not need a
kindergarten kind of tax system which is oversimplified. I t  was
- 219- 9
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obvious that lfapan could dealwith a sophisticated tax system.
Takahashi:Can I consider that the Korean War made Japanese
government conservative and its conservative government broke
your report?
Dr. Shoup:They removed some parts but not all. Especially,
investment income was taxed morelightly and capitalgains were
exempted.
Takahashi:In fact, I  am not the first to try t o l i n k Facing
t h eTax Proble m with the1949report.7 ) I n  respect to the feasi-
bility of the1949report,is it a meaningfulattempt to compare
these two writings?
Dr. Shoup:Yes,I  think i t  is meaningful. Facing theTaxP'1ob-
lle m's recommendations were much more sophisticated. For exam-
ple,one of the recommendations of Fadng t heTax Proble m was
accruaI taxation of capitalgains and accrualallowance of losses.
You don't have to wait untilthey sellthe stock,but value i t  each
year or each two or three years. You take the accrued change in
value and tax it or allow theloss. And we thought that that
would be much too sophisticated for Japan. So , I  would say that
a good dealof Facing theTa,x Proble m's recommendations were
on a more complicatedlevelthan we advocated for Japan.
Takahashi:Is i t a fact that li'acm g theTa1t Proble m criticized
the United States tax system of those days aslacking theoretical
consistency?
Dr. Shoup:Wel l, o f  course, the tax system of any country is
7 ) ?mmittee on Taxation of the TwentiethCentury Fund, nm'ng the
Taa Problem, l 9 37. As far as I know,Professor Hirosh i  Miyajima is
the first.
c. f.H.Miyajima,“Shoup kankoku no hyoka”, Kei2aiHyoron,Apr i l :l9l72.
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built up historica1ly bit by bit over the years. I t  is bound to have
inconsistencies i n  i t. We tried t o po i n t  out some of the incon-
sistencies to indicate what the future path might be.
Takahashi:The1949report and Facing theTax Proble m both
regarded a corporation as  a fiction and not as a unit of taxation.
I want to know your reasoning of a theory which regards a corpo-
ration as a fiction.
Dr.Shoup:Perhaps,“fiction”is a strong word.But ,sure ly  the
corporation as such can't pay anything. I t  is always people who
pay taxes. So w e  felt that we should try to see through a corpo-
ration and reach the people: either consumers of the corporate
products or stockholders of the corporation. They are the ones
that really bear the burden of taxes.
Takahashi:We can recognize some differences between the
1949report and Facing the Tar Proble m. As you indicated earlier,
the treatment of capitalgains and the way of rejecting doouble
taxation by a corporate income tax and a individualincome tax
are its examples. Does this fact means that thel949report regard-
ed a feasib出ty of a tax system as a more important goa l t h an
did Facing theTax Proble m ?
Dr. Shoup :No , I  would not put i t  that way. What we  pro-
posed i n F:acing the Tax Proble m was feasible for the United
States,but i t  would not be feasible for Japan right after the war,
because of the difficulty of keeping records and so on. For exam-
ple, i t  would be very difficult i n  Japan i n1949to  trace back the
costs of the things which you had bought during the war. Records
were destroyed and book accounting wa s  not as highly developed
as in the United States, and so on. So that ,we thought that Fac-- 221- 1 l
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m g t h e Tat Problem was feasible for the United States i n  the
l930's, but would not feasible for Japan i n  the1950's.
Takahashi:Can I consider that the background were verydif -
ferent between two countries?
Dr. Shoup:0h yes,the accounting background, the socialback-
ground,the business background, …al lwere different. So,we tried
to adapt the tax system to the background.
Takahashi:Are these two writings quite different from each
other?
Dr. Shoup:Yes, they each were substantially different. They
were designed for different countries with different backgrounds,
different stages of development and accounting especially.
Takahashi:I heard that many recommendations of Facing the
TatProblem were not realized. If i t  was true, can I consider that
1949report tried to reflect this bitter experience?
Dr. Shoup:It is true that F'acing・ theTa,t Problem' s  recom-
mendations were not accepted generally. Remember that shortly
afterthat, w a r  broke out. We had the gigantic task of raising
large amounts of tax revenue. I t  was a completely different set-
ting from when we wrote Facing t h e Taa Proble m. And, I  can't
remember that in thel949Mission we talked among ourselves
much about Facing theTat Proble m. Facing theTa,tProlb le m was
only one of many books and reports on taxation. Roy Blough and
MabelNewcomer who were two co-authors of Facing theTa9P'ob-
le'n were not on theJlapan mission. I was the only one on both.
And, that w a s l 2 , l 3 , o r l 4 y e a r s  earlier. So, Ican't  remember
that Facing t heTar Proble m was discussed very much by us during
that summer of l949. It  was a pretty different situation. I don't
12 -222-
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think that thel949report reflected the results of Faa'ng t heTa9
Proble m. Two books were quite different.
Takahashi:Is there any other boo;k which should be compared
with1949report inorder to understand your thought more fully?
Dr. Shoup:No, I  don't think so. I come back to the fact that
in  Japan, w e  had a very specific problem with a specific country
atthat particular time and we had to take our generaltax prin-
ciples and make them concrete to specify what could be done in
1fapan. So , I  don't see how anything else that we wrote could help
you very much especially, since we took a good deal ,of trouble
to explain why we recommended everything,in this set of four
volumes which involved a great dealof explanation. I think that
i t  is a sort of self -contained report and youcan get the reasons
from reading i t.
Ta]1nhashi:There is StadiesmCur',ent Tag Problem.
Dr. Shoup:That was a research volume and was not specifi-
cally related to the recommendations in Facing・ theTa,tP'obl,e m.
I n  that, w e  took researchpapers which we haddrawn up in  the
course of the staff work for Facing・ t h e Tat Problem. I t  was a
companion volume. Those two volumes were parts of the same
study funded by TwentiethOentury Fund.
Takahashi: I  think that t h e l949report's recommendations
about a corporate income tax and an individualincome tax were
mainlyconstituted from two systems. 〇ne is a system which is
induced from a theory which regards a corporation as a fiction,
as we talked about. Another is a fullinclusive individualincome
tax based on progressive tax rates. What do you thin:k about this
analysis 1l' -223- 13
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Dr. Shoup: I  think that's correct. We regarded the corporation
as a conduit, through which income flowed. We wanted to see
“Where did it go?”Corporate profits go to stockholderssooner
orlater. And i t  was the stockholders that we wanted to reach
with the progressive rate's system. 〇f course,we did not recom-
mend abolition of the corporate tax;that would be too drastic a
step. Instead,we tried to have a rather primitive method of in-
tegration. I t  was a credit of the corporation tax,which was not
a perfectly integrated system a t a l l. But a complete one would
have been too complicated for Japan at that time.
Takahashi:I think that the1949report's feasibility should be
more fully recognized and should be stressed more strongly now
in Japan. I n  short, I  think that t h e 1949report had not only
theoreticalconsistency but also enough feasib出ty. This fact has
been gradually forgotten as time haspassed. I want to hear your
comment about this point.
Dr. Shoup:Yes,I  agree with you on that. I think that the
system was feasible. Indeed, the changes madelater were not
made because of feasib出ty for the mostpart,but because of chang-
ing socialand economic attitudes.
Takahashi:From this point we  must reexamine the1949report
to build up some new tax system i n .fapan.
Dr. Shoup:Now,there may have been someparts of thel949
report that were proved to be not feasible. Perhaps the accessions
tax was too much to a s k . I  don't know. We thought that i t  would
be feasible. But,as you know, i t  was repealedpartly on the
grounds of unfeasibility. But, I  think tbat o:n the whole i t  was a
feasible system.
14 -224-
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6. 0bjectives of the Tax System
Takahashi:Now,some specific tax provisions which are re-
garded as exceptions are introduced in toa  basic tax system in
order to achieve any specific economic objective.For example,in
order to enlarge exportations,tax burden on related firms are
reduced. What do you think about this tendency?
Dr. Shoup:If you mean whether the tax system should be used
to achieve these endslike increasing of exports or not, I  would
say“No”. 0 n  the whole,the tax system should be designed to
raise the revenue and to raise it fairly and effectively,and then
if they want to increase exports,well,they could devalue the yen.
That is the way to increase exports. Why distort the tax system?
I think that there is a generaltendency to try to use the tax sys-
tem for every kind of economic objective which you have.After
all,there are some better tooIs to use,like the e:xchange rate. I t
tends to distort the tax system, to make i t  unfair and inefficient.
Takakashi:There are many specialtax provisions which have
a specific economic objective. So, there are some problems i n  con-
nection with a basic tax system. I want to hear your opinion
about this point.
Dr. Shoup:Wel l , I  just talked to that point. W e  have to be
carefulabout trying to make the tax system as a instrument for
al lkinds of economic policy. Because,if you try that,you make
i t  difficult to administer,hard to comply with,and very compli-
cated. The present United States income tax is very bad that
way:a1 lk inds  of specialprovisions to encourage this and encour-
age that. I t  is so complex that almost no one really understands- 225- 15
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it completely.
Takahashi:As same as you, I  think that there are many prob-
lems in Japanese tax system. Its tax system was so complicated
as is not necessary. N o w , i n  Japan it is said that a proportion of
direct taxes is so heavy,solarge scale indirect taxes must be i n-
troduced. What do you think about this tendency?
Dr.Shoup:Wel l ,you  reca l l that , in1949, i t  was about fifty-
fifty indirect taxes and direct taxes. We favored more reliance
on direct taxes,because you could get a better distribution of the
burden among the rich and the poor and so on i n  that way. So,
I don't agree that you need more indirect taxes.Bu t  again,I don't
know a great dealabout the present day Japanese tax system. So,
I can't prescribe what should be done now.
Takahashi:The base of current Japanese tax system was your
report inl949. So,this tendency is different from its base,isn't
it?
Dr.Shoup:R ight. I think so.
7. An Additional Question
Takahashi: I n  yourletter June27,1983,you said about Japanese
1ocalgovernments,“And the1oca lun i ts , though sti1l far more
independent fisca11y,are,I think, more powerfulthan before1949.
But I may be wrong on this point.” I  can't understand“this point”.8 )
Dr. Shoup:Wel1,the1ocalunits used to get their money from
the nationalgovernment, largely through those distribution grants
and the distributed pa r t o f  the income ・tax. They didn't know
from one year to the next how much they were going to get. They
8
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were at the mercy of the centralgovernment. In other words, the
localunits did not have a good independent tax system of their
own. Now,it's my impression today that they can count on their
revenues,more, they know what is going to happen. My impres-
sion is that they are not as dependent on the whim of sudden
changes in the nationalgovernment from year to year. They can
plan better. Therefore,in that sense they are more independent
fiscally. I don't mean that they raise alltheir own revenue;they
stillgetlarge grants from the centralgovernment. But it is more
orderly and it is more according to rules,or am I wrong on that?
Do you see what I mean in the sense thatlocalgovernments can
plan ahead as to the revenues so theycan act more independently
and plan their own future more?
Takahashi:I see it clearly. Thank you very much.
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